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Date: April 30, 2024 Tue
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Results for federal prisons
14 results foundAuthor: Mason, Cody Title: Dollars and Detainees: The Growth of For-Profit Detention Summary: The War on Drugs and harsh sentencing laws led to explosive growth in state and federal prison populations in the 1980s. The massive rise in prisoners overwhelmed government budgets and resources, and created opportunities for private prison companies to flourish. In 2010, one in every 13 prisoners in the U.S. was held by for-profit companies, despite evidence that private prisons often provide inadequate levels of service and are no more cost-effective than publicly-run facilities. In addition, private prisons operate on a business model that emphasizes profits over the public good, and benefit from policies that maintain America’s high incarceration rate. Nonetheless, these companies could count on predictable growth in the number of state and federal prisoners until 2008, when budget crises and policy changes led some states to reduce their prison populations and private prison contracts. The resulting losses for private prison companies were more than offset by expansion of their management of federal detainees under the jurisdiction of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Marshals Service. Between 2008 and 2010, the number of privately-held inmates decreased by 1,281, while the number of privately-held detainees increased by 3,327. This growth was part of a larger trend that saw the total private detainee population increase by 259 percent between 2002 and 2010; a change largely due to stepped up efforts to find, incarcerate, and deport people who violate immigration laws. There are indications that federal detention will remain a major market for private companies. There are two key concerns about the expansion of private federal detention that need to be addressed. First, many of the problems associated with private corrections appear equally valid in the area of private detention. These include unsubstantiated claims of cost savings, problems with oversight, and high staff turnover. Second, there are considerable concerns regarding transparency in the use of private detention. The way federal agencies report data on privately-held detainees, along with the complex contractual arrangements and tiered layers of bureaucracy that result from privatization, make it difficult to ascertain the full scope of detention privatization at any given time. Without such transparency, policymakers and citizens are inherently limited in their ability to assess the full effects of privatization. Details: Washington, DC: The Sentencing Project, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 19, 2012 at: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Dollars_and_Detainees.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Dollars_and_Detainees.pdf Shelf Number: 125687 Keywords: Federal DetaineesFederal PrisonsImmigrant DetentionPrivate Prisons (U.S.)Privatization |
Author: Greene, Judith: Mazon, Alexis Title: Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive. Unsafe. Unnecessary Summary: Presented before a House of Representatives briefing sponsored by Rep. Jared Polis of Colorado on September 13, 2012, Privately Operated Federal Prisons for Immigrants: Expensive, Unsafe, Unnecessary chronicles the May 2012 Adams County Correctional Center uprising in Natchez, Mississippi, a private for-profit facility operated by Corrections Corporation of America, under contract with the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The report details some of the tragic personal consequences for Juan Villanueva, his family, and others caught in the midst of the horrific conditions at the facility, leading to the insurrection. The report weaves into this narrative a look at the rise and fall of the private prison industry, and its resurrection through the benefit of federal contracts to detain and imprison undocumented immigrants, in an atmosphere of moral panic after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Details: Brooklyn, NY: Justice Strategies, 2012. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2012 at: http://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/privately-operated-federal-prisons-immigrants-expensive-unsafe-unnecessary Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.justicestrategies.org/publications/2012/privately-operated-federal-prisons-immigrants-expensive-unsafe-unnecessary Shelf Number: 126464 Keywords: Federal PrisonsIllegal Aliens (U.S.)Illegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: Samuels, Julie Title: Stemming the Tide: Strategies to Reduce the Growth and Cut the Cost of the Federal Prison System Summary: The federal prison population has escalated from under 25,000 inmates in 1980 to over 219,000 today. This growth has come at great expense to taxpayers and other important fiscal priorities. As policymakers consider the array of options to stem the tide of inmates, our research concludes that a combination of strategies is the best way to make a real impact. In this report, we evaluate various policy options for cutting the size and costs of the burgeoning federal prison system. The short explanation for the rapid prison population growth is that more people are sentenced to prison and for longer terms. In fiscal year (FY) 2011, more than 90 percent of convicted federal offenders were sentenced to prison, while about 10 percent got probation. By comparison, in 1986, only 50 percent received a prison sentence, over 37 percent received probation, and most of the remainder received a fine. Though the number of inmates sentenced for immigration crimes has also risen, long drug sentences are the main driver of the population's unsustainable growth. In 2011, drug trafficking sentences averaged 74 months, though they have been falling since 2008. Mandatory minimums have kept even nonviolent drug offenders behind bars for a long time. The average federal prison sentence in 2011 was 52 months, generally higher than prison sentences at the state level for similar crime types. This difference is magnified by the fact that, at the federal level, all offenders must serve at least 87 percent of their sentences, while, at the state level, most serve a lower percentage and nonviolent offenders often serve less than 50 percent of their time. Federal prisons are currently operating at between 35 and 40 percent above their rated capacity; this overcrowding is greater in high-security facilities, which, in FY 2012, were operating at 51 percent over capacity, and medium-security facilities, which were operating at 47 percent over capacity. In both medium- and high-security facilities, most inmates have histories of violence. This crowding is projected to continue to grow, with the federal prison system over capacity by at least 50,000 inmates each year through 2020. Absent any new policy changes (including bringing new prisons online), we estimate overcrowding to rise to 55 percent by 2023. Prison staffing has not kept up with population growth. The ratio of inmates to staff has grown from four to one in FY 2000 to a projected five to one in FY 2014. The US Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has found that high inmate-to-staff ratios are closely connected to increases in serious assaults. Overcrowding makes it hard to provide programs designed to keep inmates from re-offending, and it strains essential prison infrastructure, such as plumbing, through overuse. Further, the average cost of keeping an inmate behind bars is $29,000 a year. Most of these costs are fixed, so one inmate more (or less) is a difference of $10,363. The federal prison system's budget request for FY 2014 is $6.9 billion, which is more than a quarter of the Department of Justice's (DOJ's) budget. That share is projected to grow, taking resources away from other public safety priorities. Options for reform include changes that reduce the number of people entering the BOP and their sentence length (front-end options) and changes that can lead to early release or transfer to community corrections for people already in BOP custody (back-end options). The estimated impact of each of the options described below is detailed in tables ES.1 and ES.2. The underlying assumptions and methodology for the estimates are summarized in the Methodology section at the end of this report and presented in more detail in Appendix B (available online: http://www.urban.org/publications/412932.html). The cost estimates for dollars saved are based on the average marginal cost of imprisoning one inmate for one year; they do not reflect cost savings that could accrue from averted prison construction or prison closures, including staffing changes or other structural changes within the BOP. Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2013. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2013 at: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412932-stemming-the-tide.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412932-stemming-the-tide.pdf Shelf Number: 131604 Keywords: Federal PrisonsPrison ConditionsPrison OvercrowdingPrisons (U.S.) |
Author: Amnesty International Title: Entombed: Isolation in the U.S. Federal Prison System Summary: The USA incarcerates thousands of prisoners in long-term or indefinite solitary confinement. This report describes Amnesty International's concerns about conditions of severe isolation at the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum (ADX) facility in Colorado, currently the only super-maximum security prison operated by the federal government. It also examines conditions in Special Management Units (SMUs) and Security Housing Units (SHUs) operated at other federal prison facilities. Since Amnesty International toured ADX prison in 2001 subsequent requests to return to the facility have been denied. The organisation is concerned that as conditions of isolation within federal prisons have become more severe, external oversight of the facilities has declined. With prisoners held in their cells for 22-24 hours a day in severe physical and social isolation, Amnesty International believes the conditions described in this report breach international standards for the humane treatment of prisoners. Many have been held in isolation for prolonged or indefinite periods - without a means to change their circumstances - amounting to a violation of the prohibition against cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under international law. The report also details disturbing evidence of prisoners with serious mental illness being detained in harsh isolated conditions without adequate screening, treatment or monitoring. Details: London: AI, 2014. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 16, 2014 at: http://www.amnesty.org/sites/impact.amnesty.org/files/P4384USAEntombedReportFinalWeb15072014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.amnesty.org/sites/impact.amnesty.org/files/P4384USAEntombedReportFinalWeb15072014.pdf Shelf Number: 132691 Keywords: Federal PrisonsMaximum Security PrisonsPrisonersPunishmentSolitary ConfinementSupermax Prisons |
Author: Kim, KiDeuk Title: Aging Behind Bars: Trends and Implications of Graying Prisoners in the Federal Prison System Summary: This new Urban Institute study provides an in-depth examination of the growth patterns in the largest correctional system in the United States - the US Bureau of Prisons. The number of prisoners age 50 or older experienced a 330 percent increase from 1994 to 2011. The authors find that the proportion of these older prisoners is expected to have an even steeper growth curve in the near future and they may consume a disproportionately large amount of the federal prison budget. Recommendations for policy and research include expanding data-driven knowledge on older prisoners and developing cost-effective management plans for them. Details: Washington, DC: Urban Institute, 2014. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 10, 2014 at: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413222-Aging-Behind-Bars.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413222-Aging-Behind-Bars.pdf Shelf Number: 133253 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationElderly Inmates (U.S.)Elderly OffendersFederal Prisons |
Author: McGinnis, Kenneth Title: Federal Bureau of Prisons: Special Housing Unit Review and Assessment Summary: This report provides an independent, comprehensive review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' operation of restrictive housing and identifies potential operational and policy improvements. Specifically, it provides a comprehensive, detailed evaluation of the Bureau's use of restrictive housing, including the following key areas: national trends and best practices in the management of restrictive housing units; profile of the Bureau's segregation population; Bureau policies and procedures governing the management of restrictive housing; unit operations and conditions of confinement; mental health assessment and treatment within restrictive housing units; application of inmate due-process rights; reentry programming; and the impact of the use of restrictive housing on system safety and security. The report also evaluates the impact of the restrictive housing program on the federal prison system and places the Bureau's use of segregation in context with professional standards and best practices found in other correctional systems. The findings and recommendations contained in this report are based on the information and data collected while conducting site visits to the Bureau's restrictive housing units and facilities from November 2013 through May 2014. Any operational changes or new written policies implemented by the Bureau after completion of the site visits regarding their use of restrictive housing are not reflected in this report. Some such changes were in process or were scheduled for implementation after the completion of the site visits. Details: Arlington, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2014. 262p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 9, 2015 at: http://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/CNA-SHUReportFinal_123014_2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/CNA-SHUReportFinal_123014_2.pdf Shelf Number: 134770 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal InmatesFederal Prisons Restrictive Housing Solitary ConfinementU.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Contract No. DJB1PC007 Awarded to Reeves County, Texas to Operate theReeves County Detention Center I/II Pecos, Texas Summary: In January 2007, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded Contract No. DJB1PC007 to Reeves County, Texas (Reeves County) to operate the Reeves County Detention Center compounds R1 and R2 (RCDC I/II). The purpose of this service contract is to house up to 2,407 low-security, non-U.S. citizen adult males. The contract has a 4-year base period with three 2-year option periods, an estimated value of $493 million, and is the Department's second largest contract in terms of total dollars obligated since fiscal year 2014, according to the Federal Procurement Data System. In early 2015, the BOP exercised the contract's third and final option period to extend performance through January 2017. Reeves County subcontracted management of RCDC I/II to The GEO Group, Inc. (the GEO Group), a Florida-based corporation. Reeves County also subcontracted with Correct Care Solutions, LLC (CCS), a Tennessee-based company, to provide comprehensive healthcare services to RCDC I/II inmates.1 The BOP conducts monitoring and oversight of RCDC I/II operations and is responsible for examining all areas of the contract including health services, education, recreation, food service, correctional services, correctional programs, safety, inmate services, and any other area in which inmates voice concerns during interactions with BOP staff. In January 2009, there was an inmate riot at RCDC I/II.2 The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to assess BOP and RCDC I/II compliance with contract terms and conditions in the areas of billings and payments, staffing requirements, and contract oversight and monitoring. We found that Reeves County and CCS failed to comply with provisions of the Service Contract Act of 1965 (Service Contract Act). As a result, we identified almost $3 million that we either questioned as unallowable or unsupported, or believe should be put to better use.3 Specifically, we found that Reeves County improperly requested and the BOP improperly paid $1.95 million in fringe benefits it was not entitled to receive, including $175,436 in payroll taxes and workers' compensation insurance that were incorrectly calculated. Additionally, CCS requested and the BOP paid $74,765 in fringe benefits that were not properly supported with payroll documentation. Also, we identified and CCS acknowledged fringe benefit underpayments covering 12 current and former CCS employees totaling $22,628. Upon learning about our finding and quantifying these errors, CCS sent reimbursement checks to the 12 current and former CCS employees for the fringe benefit underpayments. Some of the aforementioned unallowable reimbursements have a compounding effect over time because they are incorporated into each monthly invoice until the contract ends. We therefore found that, in addition to remedying the unallowable reimbursements it has already made, the BOP should reduce the contract's monthly price by $41,088 to ensure the contractor will not improperly charge BOP an additional $945,024 should the contract continue through its final month in January 2017. We concluded that these errors were not identified previously because the BOP and the contractors did not have an accurate understanding of certain fundamental requirements of the Service Contract Act. We further found that, between February 2007 and December 2014, RCDC I/II was rated "deficient" or "unsatisfactory" in 6 of 12 award fee evaluation periods.4 BOP's award fee rating reports reflected that RCDC I/II consistently struggled to meet or exceed baseline contractual standards, received an unacceptable number of deficiencies and notices of concern; was unresponsive to BOP inquiries; struggled with staffing issues in health services and correctional services; and frequently submitted inaccurate routine paperwork, including erroneous disciplinary hearing records and monthly invoices. In addition, the BOP reports repeatedly described RCDC I/II's quality control program as minimally or marginally effective. BOP reports indicate that performance improved over time, particularly in 2013 when the contractor received a "good" rating and its first award fee, and in 2014 when the contractor received a "very good" rating and its second award fee. Regarding staffing, we found that during this contract's solicitation process, the BOP requested contractors to submit two offers, one of which eliminated minimum staffing requirements, such as maintaining staffing levels up to 90 percent for correctional services, 85 percent for health services, and 85 percent for all other departments of the BOP approved staffing plan. BOP officials told us they removed these staffing requirements to achieve cost savings and grant the contractor flexibility and discretion to manage the staffing of the facility. As a result, from the start of the contract to March 2009 there were no minimum staffing requirements for the facility. During that time, we found that the number of Correctional Officers was significantly below the 90 percent threshold that was later reincorporated into the contract after the inmate riot in January 2009. Using Staffing Report and Wage Determination information, we found that from April 2007 to March 2009, Reeves County would have spent an additional $4.67 million in order to fill enough Correctional Officer positions to meet the Staffing Plan thresholds that were later reincorporated in the contract after the January 2009 riot. According to an After-Action Report prepared by BOP officials following the January 2009 riot, the BOP noted that while low staffing levels alone were not the direct cause of the disturbances, they directly affected Security and Health Services functions. Following the inmate riot, the BOP reinstated the minimum staffing requirements into the contract, resulting in significantly increased staff at RCDC I/II, including Correctional Officer staffing that has typically been above the 90 percent threshold since the contract change.We found that RCDC I/II has also had significant issues staffing its health services unit. In December 2010, the BOP added to all contracts with privately managed correctional facilities a requirement that the contractor staff its health services unit so that staffing levels equaled or exceeded 85 percent of the contract requirement. However, from December 2010 through December 2013, a period spanning 37 months, RCDC I/II failed to meet the 85 percent threshold in 34 of the 37 months. After we expressed our concerns with these staffing issues, CCS began a concerted effort to adequately staff RCDC I/II and has exceeded the 85 percent threshold from September 2014 through February 2015. Because RCDC I/II consistently failed to achieve the 85 percent staffing requirement from December 2010 through December 2013, its vacant health services positions became subject to invoice deductions. Specifically, the Federal Acquisition Regulation authorizes the BOP to address non-compliant staffing by reducing the contract price to reflect the "reduced value of the services performed." However, the BOP calculated the reduced value of the services performed based on the minimum pay rates required by Department of Labor (DOL) issued wage determinations instead of the higher market value salaries that CCS had been paying its health services personnel, resulting in smaller invoice deductions. For one personnel category, licensed vocational nurses, we estimated that CCS would have had to pay $314,856 more in total compensation from 2011-2013, had the BOP continued to use actual rates as the basis for deductions instead of the lesser DOL rate. Given RCDC I/II's past issues with staffing its health services unit and the differences between the aforementioned deduction methods, we believe that BOP's use of the DOL rate as a deduction basis creates a potential financial incentive for CCS to accept less costly monthly vacancy deductions rather than filling costlier positions at market rates. Our audit also assessed RCDC I/II's quality control program. We found that this program, which had been minimally or marginally effective, improved over time and BOP onsite staff generally provided comprehensive monitoring and oversight. However, we identified areas for continued improvement. Specifically, RCDC I/II needs to retain original quality control-related documentation as required by the contract, fully document monitoring activities, and complete corrective action plans for significant deficiencies. Finally, we found that RCDC I/II officials had converted a general population housing unit into a "modified monitoring unit" referred to as the "J-Unit." The purpose of the J-Unit was to isolate from the rest of the compound's population inmates found to be coercing other inmates to join demonstrations, and whose behavior was creating institutional security problems capable of jeopardizing the safety of RCDC I/II staff and inmates. J-Unit inmates have more restricted movement and less access to institutional services than general population inmates. The OIG's review of the J-Unit determined that RCDC I/II lacked specific policies and procedures that addressed important aspects of the J-Unit's operations, such as (1) guidance on what evidence is necessary to place an inmate into the J-Unit; (2) procedures to ensure inmates receive due process with respect to placement in J-Unit, including the ability to challenge their placement in the J-Unit and the steps necessary to re-designate inmates to an unrestricted general population unit; (3) monitoring or oversight mechanisms to ensure the J-Unit is used as intended; and (4) safeguards to ensure inmate rights are consistent, to the maximum extent possible in light of security concerns, with inmates in other general population housing. This report makes 18 recommendations to assist BOP in improving contractor and subcontractor operations and BOP monitoring and oversight at RCDC I/II under Contract No. DJB1PC007, and in addressing the almost $3 million identified as questioned costs and funds that should be put to better use. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, 2015. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 15-15: Accessed April 30, 2015 at: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2015/a1515.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/2015/a1515.pdf Shelf Number: 135430 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal PrisonsPrison AdministrationPrison Conditions (Texas) |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Federal Prison System: Justice Could Better Measure Progress Addressing Incarceration Challenges Summary: The federal inmate population has increased more than eight-fold since 1980, and DOJ has identified prison crowding as a critical issue since 2006. BOP's rising costs and offender recidivism present incarceration challenges to both DOJ and the nation. For example, BOP's operating costs (obligations) have increased over time, and in fiscal year 2014 amounted to more than $7 billion, or 19 percent of DOJ's total obligations. In recent years, DOJ has implemented targeted initiatives in response, and Senate Report 113-78 included a provision for GAO to review these efforts. This report discusses (1) DOJ's initiatives to address federal incarceration challenges, (2) the extent to which DOJ is measuring its efforts, and (3) the extent to which DOJ is coordinating across its components to implement the Smart on Crime Initiative. GAO reviewed DOJ documentation, interviewed DOJ officials, and compared DOJ efforts with performance measurement and coordination best practices GAO has previously identified. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-454: Accessed July 9, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670896.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670896.pdf Shelf Number: 135974 Keywords: Costs of Criminal JusticeCosts of IncarcerationCriminal Justice PolicyFederal PrisonsImprisonment, Economic Aspects ofPrisonsSmart on Crime |
Author: James, Nathan Title: The Federal Prison Population Buildup: Options for Congress Summary: Since the early 1980s, there has been a historically unprecedented increase in the federal prison population. The total number of inmates under the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) jurisdiction increased from approximately 25,000 in FY1980 to over 205,000 in FY2015. Between FY1980 and FY2013, the federal prison population increased, on average, by approximately 5,900 inmates annually. However, the number of inmates in the federal prison system has decreased from FY2013 to FY2015. Some of the growth is attributable to changes in federal criminal justice policy during the previous three decades. These changes include increases in the number of federal offenses subject to mandatory minimum sentences, changes to the federal criminal code that have made more crimes federal offenses, and the elimination of parole. The growth in the federal prison population can be a detriment to BOP's ability to safely operate their facilities and maintain the federal prison infrastructure. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that the growing number of federal inmates has resulted in an increased use of double and triple bunking, waiting lists for education and drug treatment programs, limited meaningful work opportunities, and increased inmate-to-staff ratios. These factors can contribute to increased inmate misconduct, which negatively affects the safety and security of inmates and staff. The burgeoning prison population has contributed to mounting operational expenditures for the federal prison system. BOP's appropriations increased more than $7.1 billion from FY1980 ($330 million) to FY2016 ($7.479 billion). As a result, BOP's expanding budget is starting to consume a larger share of the Department of Justice's overall annual appropriation. Should Congress choose to consider policy options to address the issues resulting from the growth in the federal prison population, policymakers could choose options such as increasing the capacity of the federal prison system by building more prisons; investing in rehabilitative programming (e.g., substance abuse treatment or educational programs) as a way of keeping inmates constructively occupied and potentially reducing recidivism after inmates are released; or placing more inmates in private prisons. Policymakers might also consider whether they want to revise some of the policy changes over the past three decades that have contributed to the steadily increasing number of offenders being incarcerated. For example, Congress could consider options such as (1) modifying mandatory minimum penalties, (2) expanding the use of Residential Reentry Centers, (3) placing more offenders on probation, (4) reinstating parole for federal inmates, (5) expanding the amount of good time credit an inmate can earn, and (6) repealing federal criminal statutes for some offenses. Congress is currently considering legislation (e.g., S. 2123, H.R. 3713) that would put into effect some of the policy options discussed in this report, including expanding the "safety valve" for some low-level offenders, allowing inmates to earn additional good time credit as a part of a risk and needs assessment system, and reducing mandatory minimum penalties for some offenses. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: R42937: Accessed May 26, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf Shelf Number: 139227 Keywords: Federal PrisonsPrison PopulationPrisonersPrisons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Federal Prisons System: Justice Has Used Alternatives to Incarceration, but Could Better Measure Program Outcomes Summary: Since 1980, the federal prison population increased from about 25,000 to almost 200,000, as of March 2016. In part to help reduce the size and related costs of the federal prison population, DOJ has taken steps to slow its growth by pursuing alternatives to incarceration at various stages of the criminal justice process for nonviolent, low-level offenders. Senate Report 113-78 included a provision for GAO to review DOJ's management of the federal prison population. This report (1) describes factors criminal justice stakeholders consider when using incarceration alternatives at or before sentencing and identifies the extent to which those alternatives are used, (2) describes factors BOP considers when using incarceration alternatives for inmates and the extent of their use, and (3) assesses the extent DOJ has measured the cost implications and outcomes of using the alternatives. GAO analyzed DOJ and federal judiciary branch data and documents from fiscal years 2009 through 2015, and interviewed DOJ and judiciary officials at headquarters and in 11 selected nongeneralizable judicial districts about the use of alternatives. GAO selected districts to provide geographic diversity and a mix of districts using and not using the alternatives. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ enhance its tracking of data on use of pretrial diversions and that DOJ and BOP obtain outcome data and develop measures for the alternatives used. DOJ concurred Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 61p. Source: Internet Resource: GA)-16-516: Accessed September 27, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677983.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677983.pdf Shelf Number: 147910 Keywords: Alternatives to IncarcerationFederal PrisonsPretrial DiversionRecidivism |
Author: Akers, Kimberly Title: Factors Influencing the Completion of the GED in a Federal Correctional Setting: A Multiple Regression, Correlational-Predictive Study Summary: Correctional education's primary goal is to reduce recidivism and increase employment among ex-offenders. The Bureau of Prison's practical goal in its mandatory GED program is to maximize the number of inmates obtaining the GED in a given time period. The purpose of this research is to model the number of instructional hours an inmate requires to obtain the GED as a regression on socio-demographic and Bureau of Prison policy variables related to inmate conduct in education programs. This quantitative research uses multiple regression to produce and analyze the model. An archival random sample of GED graduates in a large federal correctional complex is selected, the model fit and diagnosed, and a hold-out sample tested for predictive reliability. Any conclusions regarding policy alternatives for the Bureau of Prisons will then be drawn. Such alternatives may lead to improvements in general criminal justice and in correctional education in particular. Details: Lynchburg, VA:Liberty University, 2013. 134p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed November 28, 2016 at: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1730&context=doctoral Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://digitalcommons.liberty.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1730&context=doctoral Shelf Number: 147911 Keywords: Correctional EducationCorrectional ProgramsFederal PrisonsRecidivism |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contract with CoreCivic, Inc. to Operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez, Mississippi Summary: In April 2009, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded a contract to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which is now known as CoreCivic, Inc., to house up to 2,567 low-security, non-U.S. citizen adult male inmates in the Adams County Correctional Center (Adams County). The BOP exercised the contract's second of three 2-year option periods in 2015, extending it through July 2017 and increasing its value to about $468 million. As of June 2016, it was the third largest Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) contract in terms of dollars obligated since fiscal year (FY) 2009. The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit, covering the period April 1, 2012, through March 31, 2015, to: (1) assess CoreCivic's contract performance; (2) determine whether CoreCivic complied with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to the contract; and (3) assess the BOP's formation and administration of the contract. We found that CoreCivic's execution of the contract's requirements did not fully accomplish the BOP's program. goals in several respects. In May 2012, an inmate riot at the facility resulted in a correctional officer's death and injuries to approximately 20 staff and inmates. The riot, according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affidavit, was a consequence of what inmates perceived to be inadequate medical care, substandard food, and disrespectful staff members. A BOP after-action report found deficiencies in staffing levels, staff experience, communication between staff and inmates, and CoreCivic's intelligence systems. The report specifically cited the lack of Spanish-speaking staff and staff inexperience. Four years after the riot, we were deeply concerned to find that the facility was plagued by the same significant deficiencies in correctional and health services and Spanish-speaking staffing. In 19 of the 38 months following the riot, we found CoreCivic staffed correctional services at an even lower level than at the time of the riot in terms of actual post coverage. Yet CoreCivic's monthly reports to the BOP, which were based on simple headcounts, showed that correctional staffing levels had improved in 36 of those 38 months. With regard to Spanish-speaking staff, while the BOP's post-riot after-action plan recommended adding to the contract minimum requirements for bilingual staff, we found that the BOP did not modify the contract to include this requirement until June 2015, subsequent to the start of our audit. Moreover, the contract modification does not define the level of speaking proficiency required and has no deadline or target date for compliance. As of July 2015, the facility's inmate population consisted of approximately 2,300 aliens, predominately Mexican-nationals, yet only 4 of 367 staff spoke fluent Spanish. By February 2016, CoreCivic officials told us the number of fluent Spanish-speaking staff actually dropped to three people, and CoreCivic's January 2016 job announcements for correctional officers stated no preference for bilingual applicants. In addition, the BOP told us that it does not validate the contractor's staff for Spanish-speaking skills, and has not established any validation criteria for doing so. We also found lower qualification levels and significantly higher staffing turnover rates for Adams County correctional officers and believe these factors contributed to the facility's lack of experienced staff, which the BOP identified in its after-action report as a systemic problem in the area of safety and security at the facility. We reviewed CoreCivic's hiring practices and determined the facility employs correctional officers with qualifications that would have been insufficient for employment at BOP-managed institutions. For example, the BOP requires entry-level correctional officers to have either a 4-year college degree or equivalent work experience, while CoreCivic does not require education beyond high school. Additionally, we found significantly higher turnover rates at the facility than those at comparable BOP institutions and believe it likely results from the substantially lower pay and benefits provided by CoreCivic. We found CoreCivic pays significantly lower wages and offers less time off than the BOP, and provides fewer career advancement opportunities. For example, the BOP pays entry-level correctional officers $18.69 per hour, 48 percent higher than the $12.60 per hour paid by CoreCivic. The State of Mississippi also offers its correctional officers more generous wages and paid time off than CoreCivic. Furthermore, the BOP offers new correctional officers noncompetitive promotion potential to $26.91 an hour, while CoreCivic pays correctional officers, throughout their careers, only the required prevailing wage rates set forth by the Department of Labor's Service Contract Act wage determinations. The BOP's contract with CoreCivic does not address either correctional officer qualification requirements or staff pay and benefits. We believe the BOP should evaluate the extent to which employee qualification levels and turnover rates impact safety and security concerns, and whether its contractual terms should be modified to address those concerns. In addition, while the BOP's solicitation that resulted in the Adams County contract required companies to develop a staffing plan that would illustrate the "total number of full-time equivalents (FTE) for each position title," based on our discussions with BOP and CoreCivic officials, it became apparent that the contract was vague about how staffing levels should be calculated. A 2011 contract modification provided that staffing levels should not fall below a monthly average of 90 percent for Correctional Services and 85 percent for Health Services of the BOP-approved staffing plan. Both the BOP and CoreCivic told us they interpreted the contract to allow the calculation of staffing levels to be based on headcounts rather than FTE, and leave the determination of day-to-day staff assignments to the discretion of CoreCivic. As a result, we found the staffing levels CoreCivic reported to the BOP reflected neither actual staffing at the facility nor staffing insufficiencies. Specifically, CoreCivic reported to the BOP simple headcounts of staff recorded on payroll records, regardless of the hours each employee actually worked. When we re-calculated correctional services staffing levels based on FTEs using time and attendance records, we found that, throughout the 4-year period we reviewed, staffing levels were lower than the levels represented by CoreCivic's headcounts and were frequently lower than the BOP's minimum staffing threshold. We found similar issues regarding CoreCivic's reporting of health services staffing. Because the BOP was unaware of these staffing insufficiencies, it was unable to assess the adequacy of staffing levels at the facility. When we reported these issues and our concerns about them to BOP officials, they told us CoreCivic's reporting was consistent with the contract. We found that had the contract clearly specified that staffing levels should be measured using FTEs, between July 2011 and July 2015 the BOP could have taken $1,927,307 in invoice deductions as a result of inadequate correctional and health services staffing levels. We believe this nearly $2 million that the BOP expended could have been avoided with more precise contract language and was wasteful. We also found that, beginning in December 2012, CoreCivic excluded from its required staffing reports the status of five critical health services positions identified in the approved staffing plan, namely two dentists, two physicians, and one advanced registered nurse practitioner. As a result, the BOP, which was not notified of and did not identify the change, was unable to assess the effect of any vacancies on service provision or invoice amounts. We believe that this gap in oversight had a negative effect on CoreCivic's ability to provide quality health care at the Adams County facility. In fact, we found that between December 2012 and September 2015, the Adams County facility was staffed with only a single physician for 434 days (43 percent of the time) and a single dentist for 689 days (69 percent of the time), resulting in inmate-to-provider ratios that were about double those specified in BOP program statements. Finally, we found several aspects of the BOP's control and oversight of the contract performance to be inadequate. The BOP structured this contract as a performance-based acquisition, for which the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires a performance work statement, measurable performance standards, and a method of assessing contractor performance against those standards. However, the BOP did not implement appropriate performance standards to measure and evaluate CoreCivic's performance. For example, the BOP's oversight of staffing levels is limited because the contract requirements do not sufficiently specify how CoreCivic should measure and report facility staffing levels. We also found CoreCivic inconsistently used industry-standard dietary guidelines to evaluate the nutritional adequacy of food service offerings at the facility, an issue that may have been avoided had the contract specified which standards CoreCivic should have followed. Additionally, the BOP's oversight of billings was inadequate in several ways, resulting in the BOP failing to identify instances where CoreCivic did not apply mandatory invoice deductions. In August 2016, the Deputy Attorney General directed the BOP to begin reducing, and ultimately end, its use of privately operated prisons. Because this order was issued after the close of our audit period, any analysis of its basis or effect were outside of this audit's scope. This report makes 9 recommendations to assist the BOP in improving operations under the Adams County contract and in addressing $42,300 we have identified as questioned costs. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2016. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Shelf Number: 145091 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal Bureau of PrisonsFederal PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Federal Prisons: Information on Inmates with Serious Mental Illness and Strategies to Reduce Recidivism Summary: About two-thirds of inmates with a serious mental illness in the Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) were incarcerated for four types of offenses-drug (23 percent), sex offenses (18 percent), weapons and explosives (17 percent), and robbery (8 percent)-as of May 27, 2017. GAO's analysis found that BOP inmates with serious mental illness were incarcerated for sex offenses, robbery, and homicide/aggravated assault at about twice the rate of inmates without serious mental illness, and were incarcerated for drug and immigration offenses at about half or less the rate of inmates without serious mental illness. GAO also analyzed available data on three selected states' inmate populations and the most common crimes committed by inmates with serious mental illness varied from state to state due to different law enforcement priorities, definitions of serious mental illness and methods of tracking categories of crime in their respective data systems. BOP does not track costs related to incarcerating or providing mental health care services to inmates with serious mental illness, but BOP and selected states generally track these costs for all inmates. BOP does not track costs for inmates with serious mental illness in part because it does not track costs for individual inmates due to resource restrictions and the administrative burden such tracking would require. BOP does track costs associated with mental health care services system-wide and by institution. System-wide, for fiscal year 2016, BOP spent about $72 million on psychology services, $5.6 million on psychotropic drugs and $4.1 million on mental health care in residential reentry centers. The six state departments of corrections each used different methods and provided GAO with estimates for different types of mental health care costs. For example, two states provided average per-inmate costs of incarceration for mental health treatment units where some inmates with serious mental illness are treated; however, these included costs for inmates without serious mental illness housed in those units. DOJ, Department of Health and Human Service's Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and criminal justice and mental health experts have developed a framework to reduce recidivism among adults with mental illness. The framework calls for correctional agencies to assess individuals' recidivism risk and substance abuse and mental health needs and target treatment to those with the highest risk of reoffending. To help implement this framework, SAMHSA, in collaboration with DOJ and other experts, developed guidance for mental health, correctional, and community stakeholders on (1) assessing risk and clinical needs, (2) planning treatment in custody and upon reentry based on risks and needs, (3) identifying post-release services, and (4) coordinating with community-based providers to avoid gaps in care. BOP and the six states also identified strategies for reducing recidivism consistent with this guidance, such as memoranda of understanding between correctional and mental health agencies to coordinate care. Further, GAO's literature review found that programs that reduced recidivism among offenders with mental illness generally offered multiple support services, such as mental health and substance abuse treatment, case management, and housing assistance. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2018. 75p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-18-182: Accessed February 27, 2018 at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690279.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690279.pdf Shelf Number: 149264 Keywords: Federal PrisonsMental Health ServicesMentally Ill InmatesPrisonersPrisonsRecidivism |
Author: James, Nathan Title: Risk and Needs Assessment in the Federal Prison System Summary: The number of people incarcerated in federal prisons increased dramatically over the past three decades. While the number of inmates in the federal prison system has decreased since FY2013, the federal prison population remains substantially larger than it was three decades ago. Concerns about both the economic and social consequences of the country's reliance on incarceration have led to calls for reforms to the nation's criminal justice system, including improving the federal prison system's ability to rehabilitate incarcerated offenders by better assessing their risk for recidivism and addressing their criminogenic needs. "Criminogenic needs," are factors that contribute to criminal behavior that can be changed and/or addressed through interventions. There have been legislative proposals to implement a risk and needs assessment system in federal prisons. The system would be used to place inmates in appropriate rehabilitative programs. Under the proposed system some inmates would be eligible for earned time credits for completing rehabilitative programs that reduce their risk of recidivism. Such credits would allow inmates to be placed on prerelease custody earlier. The proposed system would exclude inmates convicted of certain offenses from being eligible for earned time credits. Risk and needs assessment instruments typically consist of a series of items used to collect data on offender behaviors and attitudes that research indicates are related to the risk of recidivism. Generally, inmates are classified as being at a high, moderate, or low risk of recidivism. Assessment instruments are comprised of static and dynamic risk factors. Static risk factors do not change (e.g., age at first arrest or gender), while dynamic risk factors can either change on their own or be changed through an intervention (e.g., current age, education level, or employment status). In general, research suggests that the most commonly used assessment instruments can, with a moderate level of accuracy, predict who is at risk for violent recidivism. It also suggests that of the most commonly used risk assessments none distinguishes itself from the others when it comes to predictive validity. The Risk-Needs-Responsivity (RNR) model has become the dominant paradigm in risk and needs assessment. The risk principle states that convicted offenders need to be placed in programs that are commensurate with their risk level; in other words, provide more intensive treatment and services to high-risk offenders while low-risk offenders should receive minimal or even no intervention. The need principle states that effective treatment should also focus on addressing the criminogenic needs that contribute to criminal behavior. The responsivity principle states that rehabilitative programming should be delivered in a style and mode that is consistent with the ability and learning style of the offender. There are several issues policymakers might contemplate should Congress choose to consider legislation to implement a risk and needs assessment system in federal prisons, including the following: - Is there the potential for bias in the use of risk and needs assessment? - Should certain inmates be ineligible for earned time credits? - Should prison programming focus on inmates at high risk of recidivism? - Should risk assessment be incorporated into sentencing? - Should there be a decreased focus on long prison sentences? Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2018. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: R44087: Accessed September 24, 2018 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44087.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44087.pdf Shelf Number: 151658 Keywords: Crime Prevention Federal PrisonsRecidivism Risk Assessment |